How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of Human Resource Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm by Jones, Derek  C. et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Working Papers ILR Collection 
December 2006 
How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of 
Human Resource Management Policies on Performance in a 
Retail Firm 
Derek C. Jones 
Hamilton College 
Panu Kalmi 
Helsinki School of Economics 
Antti Kauhanen 
Helsinki School of Economics 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of Human Resource 
Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm 
Abstract 
By assembling and analyzing new panel data, we investigate the impact of innovative human resource 
management (HRM) practices on performance for a retail firm. Monthly financial and performance data 
for 2001-2003, for all (47) units, are combined with information for crucial aspects of HRM environments 
obtained from employee surveys and multiple case visits. Our rich data include measures of the operating 
environment, important dimensions of core inputs and output is measured as value added. Augmented 
production functions, including specifications with both establishment and manager fixed effects, are 
estimated. We find that when employees have opportunities to participate, receive appropriate 
information and pertinent rewards, productivity is enhanced. Thus even in settings where employees do 
simple tasks and employees are relatively low-skilled our findings provide more solid support than many 
earlier studies for retailing and service firms that novel HRM practices can improve business 
performance. 
Keywords 
retail trade, productivity, human resource management (HRM), insider, econometrics, employee 
involvement, employer, employee, firm, skill, manager, reward 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Jones, J. C., Kalmi, P., & Kauhanen, A. (2006) How does employee involvement stack up? The effects of 
human resource management policies on performance in a retail firm. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell 
University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/3 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright by the authors. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/3 
How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of Human Resource
Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm
Derek C. Jones, Panu Kalmi and Antti Kauhanenl
December 13, 2006
Abstract
By assembling and analyzing new panel data, we investigate the impact of innovative human
resource management (HRM) practices on performance for a retail firm. Monthly financial
and performance data for 2001-2003, for a1\ (47) units, are combined with information for
crucial aspects of HRM environments obtained from employee surveys and multiple case
visits. Our rich data include measures of the operating environment, important dimensions of
core inputs and output is measured as value added. Augmented production functions,
including specifications with both establishment and manager fixed effects, are estimated. We
find that when employees have opportunities to participate, receive appropriate information
and pertinent rewards, productivity is enhanced. Thus even in settings where employees do
simple tasks and employees are relatively 10w-ski1\edour findings provide more solid support
than many earlier studies for retailing and service firms that novel HRM practices can
improve business performance.
Keywords: retail trade, productivity, human resource management (HRM), insider
econometrics, employee involvement
1 D.C. Jones: Hamilton College, Clinton NY 13323,e-mail diones(dhamilton.edu; P.Kalmi and A. Kauhanen:
Department of Economics, Helsinki School of Economics, and HECER, P.O. BOX 1210, Helsinki 00101,
Finland, e-mail mmu.kalmif(i'hse.ti, anttj.k<!QQ5l1ls:ndhse.ti.Kauhanen is the corresponding author. The authors
are grateful to support from the Academy of Finland (Project No. 206027) and The Finnish Work Environment
Fund (Grant No. 103313). Jones' work was supported in part by a Foundation for Economic Education
Fellowship and NSF SES-0522117 for which he is grateful. Part of the research was carried out when Kalmi was
visiting the ILR School at Cornell University and when Kauhanen was visiting SKOPE at the University of
Oxford and they are grateful for the respective institutions for their generous support. The paper has benefited
from comments on an earlier draft by seminar participants at the NFF annual conference at Aarhus, SKOPE,
Oxford, Finnish Society for Economic Research XXVII Annual Meeting, Cornell University, Rutgers
University. and by Jed DeVaro, Tor Eriksson, Kevin Hallock, Pekka IImakunnas, Jeffrey Pliskin, Matti Pohjola
and Petri Rouvinen. The authors are extremely grateful to a number of individuals working for the case firm for
interviews, comments and access to the data. The data used in this study are proprietary and were obtained only
by signing a confidentiality agreement. Hence the authors arc unable to release these data.
How Does Employee Involvement Stack Up? The Effects of Human Resource
Management Policies on Performance in a Retail Firm
Abstract
By assembling and analyzing new panel data, we investigate the impact of innovative human
resource management (HRM) practices on performance for a retail firm. Monthly financial
and performance data for 2001-2003, for all (47) units, are combined with information for
crucial aspects of HRM environments obtained from employee surveys and multiple case
visits. Our rich data include measures of the operating environment, important dimensions of
core inputs and output is measured as value added. Augmented production functions,
including specifications with both establishment and manager fixed effects, are estimated. We
find that when employees have opportunities to participate, receive appropriate information
and pertinent rewards, productivity is enhanced. Thus even in settings where employees do
simple tasks and employees are relatively low-skilled our findings provide more solid support
than many earlier studies for retailing and service firms that novel HRM practices can
improve business performance.
Keywords: retail trade, productivity, human resource management (HRM), insider
econometrics, employee involvement
2
I. Introduction
In this study we assemble a unique panel data set from a large Finnish retail firm and use
it to investigate the impact of innovative human resource management practices (hereafter,
HRM) on firm performance. In many countries including the U.S. and Japan (e.g. Osterman,
2000; Blasi and Kruse, 2006; Kato, 2006) recent years have witnessed extensive reforms in
work organization. Unsurprisingly the literature that examines the links between HRM and
business performance has also grown rapidly as scholars from different fields in the broad
area of industrial relations have applied varying approaches to explore new types of evidence
and research questions. One prominent approach is "insider econometrics" (Ichniowski and
Shaw, 2003) or econometric case studies (Jones and Kato, 2004). In such studies the natural
focus is on the effect of a single HRM practice on productivity and examples of recent studies
using this approach include Lazear (2000) and Hamilton et a\. (2003). A crucial advantage of
this method is that researchers are able to acquire a much more thorough understanding of the
particular production process and therefore are able to estimate the production function and
test associated hypotheses in a much more reliable way than are researchers who rely only on
survey data (Ichiniowski and Shaw, 2003). Moreover, since the units being compared are
often fairly homogenous in many respects, the confidence on the reliability of the estimated
coefficients of primary interest is greatly increased.
Insider econometric studies of firms outside of manufacturing are very scarce and the bulk
of empirical literature of any kind in the broader field of HRM-performance has concentrated
on manufacturing companies (e.g. Ichniowski et a\., 1997; Appelbaum et a\., 2000). While
there are some important exceptions of research on service sector firms, especially Batt's
work on telecommunications industry (e.g. Batt, 1999; 2002) and Bartel's (2004) study of a
Canadian bank, studies on the HRM-performance link in the retail sector are rare. An
important contribution of the paper stems from this fact that research on service sector firms
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is quite sparse; indeed ours may be the first econometric case study for a retailing firm. I The
study of firms in the service sector is important since the nature and scope of the gains from
the use of innovative HRM practices and the most important channels of HRM may not be
universal but instead may be expected to vary by sector or by other contingencies (Delery and
Doty, 1996; Baron and Kreps, 1999; Appelbaum et aI., 2000).
Thus, since retail trade is characterized by low pay, a high proportion of part-time
employees, and a high proportion of female employees, it has been suggested that the HRM
environment in the retail sector would be rather traditional (Kauhanen 2006). Similarly,
Appelbaum and Batt (1994) have argued that services often lag behind manufacturing in the
introduction of workplace innovations, such as total quality management or autonomous
teams. However, globalization and regulatory changes that have increased competition have
compelled service providers to consider means for improving productivity by the application
of advanced HRM practices.
Another contribution of the study is that we extend the geographical range of empirical
studies-to date most empirical work in this field has focused on firms in North America and
it is important to see if findings derived from studies of cases elsewhere carry over to other
countries. Ours is the first such study of a firm in Finland? After Finland joined the European
Union in 1995, many businesses were exposed to a much more competitive environment. This
has posed challenges to the Finnish retail trade sector where productivity has been relatively
low in international comparisons (Mankinen et aI., 2002; lalava, 2005.) Hence, knowledge
about the potential impact of HRM on performance in Finnish service firms is especially
pertinent for Finnish companies, as well as service sector firms elsewhere that face enhanced
competition in an increasingly integrated world.
By undertaking visits to selected branches as well as the firm's operational headquarters,
we have collected most unusual data from the case. These include monthly financial and
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performance data for the period 2001-2003 for all branches. These data are combined with
information for crucial aspects of HR environments that are obtained from annual employee
surveys that capture key dimensions of employees' perceptions of HRM practices and are
integrated with information on managerial turnover and other controls that capture differences
in the retailing environment. By estimating augmented production functions and using panel
data methods (that include both establishment and manager fixed effects as well as month and
year dummies) we provide what we believe are some of the most reliable findings that are
available on the HRM-performance link for a service sector firm. Our main results are robust
to using annual (rather then monthly) performance measures. In addition, our estimating
methods are supported by exogeneity tests.
II. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Literature
Since ours is not a theoretical contribution, here we continue by merely highlighting some
key themes in that literature. We endeavor to focus on those theoretical aspects that are most
pertinent for our particular case, a retailing firm with a specific set of HRM policies.
The idea of employee involvement as part of HRM strategy is not new. As early as the
1930s the human relations school argued for the benefits of employee involvement programs.3
More recently, a useful framework for analyzing the effects of employee involvement has
been developed by Appelbaum et al. (2000). Their premise is that employees may possess
valuable information on the production process (here the service process) that management
may not have. The firm would like its employees to use this knowledge to benefit the
organization. In order to elicit higher discretionary effort from employees, three conditions
have to be met. First, employees need to be able to participate in substantive decisions.
Second, employees need to have appropriate skills and, third, employees need appropriate
incentives.4
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This framework implies that employees cannot supply discretionary effort if theydo not
have either the channels through which to participate in substantive decisions or the skills
required to make it worthwhile or sufficient information. [n addition this approach implies
that employees are not willing to supply discretionary effort if they do not have the
appropriate incentives to do so and also emphasizes the need for a coherent system of HRM
practices. The benefits of coherent practices are not unique to this framework, but there
appears to be consensus that economic payoff of HRM practices is likely to be greater when
packages of measures exist. For example, Ichniowski et al. (1997) argue that there are
powerful complementarities when sets of HRM practices coexist. However, if inconsistent or
defective sets of HRM practices are implemented, the literature suggests the possibility of
negative or negligible effects on business performance. For example, Ben-Ner and Jones
(1995) point out that employee involvement alone may not lead to enhanced business
performance, especially in the absence of increasing return rights.
In examining particular components of the HRM environment, the opportunity to
participate in decisions may have an impact on productivity through multiple channels. First,
it may affect employee motivation to put forth effort. Benabou and Tirole (2003, Section 3)
show that empowering an employee to carry out some task demonstrates the supervisor's trust
in the agent's ability or motivation to carry out the task, which in turn leads to a higher level
of effort in equilibrium. Second, participation may develop employee skills. Batt (2002)
argues that opportunities to participate in job design enable employees to learn about the
content of their work and also to make productive suggestions. Appelbaum et al. (2000) find
that participation also increases the intrinsic rewards from work. The next section discusses
in more detail how participation may affect productivity in our case.
Preuss (2003) argues that the opportunities to participate and employee skills can lead to
higher performance only when employees receive sufficient information concerning their
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work tasks. In our empirical analysis, we also consider information regarding the performance
of the department as an important part ofthe overall HRM environment.
In circumstances where the role of the monetary incentives is limited, as is true in this
retail case, the role of managerial recognition may be pronounced. For instance, Benabou and
Tirole (2003) argue that managerial recognition of work that is well done may increase
agents' intrinsic motivation to put forth effort in the future.
When the employees' tasks are interdependent, it becomes important that each employee
within the department shares the same goals. Otherwise an individual employee may inflict
disproportionate damage to the departmental performance by withholding effort and
performing actions that are not consistent with what others are doing.
Some authors have stressed the role of the production technology in determining the
effectiveness of employee involvement (e.g. Baron and Kreps, 1999). According to Ben-Ner
et al. (1999), in situations where task uncertainty, task interdependence and task complexity
are relatively low, the pay-offs to innovative HRM practices are relatively low. By and large
they argue that retailing firms are expected to provide good examples of this characterization.
Similarly, Banker et al. (1996) stress the role of managerial control in situations where task
complexity is low and contact with the customer infrequent. In contrast, in situations where
salespeople are frequently in contact with the customers, employee motivation, interpersonal
skills and product knowledge become important, and HRM policies should be designed to
facilitate employee motivation and skill development (see also Batt, 1999; Bartel, 2004).
The effects of HRM practices on performance need not necessarily be positive, even if the
practices were introduced in a coherent manner. For example, meetings, whether on an
individual or a collective basis, may also take a lot of time away from other activities.
Furthermore, HRM practices may also be ineffective or even counterproductive in settings
where employees are given expectations about increased discretion, but the expectations are
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not fulfilled (e.g. Heller et aI., 1998). Similarly measures designed to improve skills may be
poorly implemented or may not succeed if the information on the nature and purpose of a new
program is communicated poorly to affected employees.
Turning to the empirical evidence on the impact of HRM practices on productivity in the
service sector, as already noted, this is quite limited. Bartel (2004) found that among the
branches of a large bank, employee perceptions on performance feedback and recognition
systems had a significant and positive impact on the growth of sales of loans. Batt (2002)
used a nationally representative sample of call centers and found that greater use of high-
involvement practices was associated with lower quit rates and higher sales growth. Studying
a large regional telecommunications company, Batt (1999) finds that the adoption of self-
managed teams leads to sustained productivity improvements. For the specific case of
retailing, Banker et al. (1996) find positive evidence on the effects of incentive pay with
retailers operating in upscale markets, but not with those serving the mass market. And in a
study of 50 retail cooperatives Jones (1987) found that worker representation on the board of
directors and participation in enterprise results were statistically significantly associated with
better business performance.s
In sum, it appears that the empirical record for the service sector, including retailing, is
suggestive of a HR-performance link. However, existing empirical work also draws attention
to the difficulties involved in empirical work in this area. For example, there is no general
agreement as to what constitutes the preferred set of HRM practices or how the potential
gains might be expected to be shared between different parties. Most studies illustrate the
difficulties in moving from theory to appropriate empirical specifications, and of the potential
sensitivity of findings to, for example, the use of differing scales to capture variation in HR
environments.6 Also, the measures of productivity are not always ideal - for instance, it is
common to use sales rather than value added as a measure of productivity. Hence it is clear
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that empirical analysis in this area is still in its infancy and that more reliable work is needed
before these preliminary conclusions can be accepted.
III Description of the Finnish context and the Case
Since the institutional context within which Finnish firms operate is unfamiliar to many,
before describing our case we continue by briefly highlighting important features of that
environment. As with relatively low-skilled workers throughout the service sector in Finland,7
basic terms and conditions of employment are determined by a national collective agreement,
in this case for the retail sector. Importantly this agreement provides that employees receive at
least the fixed hourly wage that is stipulated in the national agreement of the sector. As retail
trade represents an industry where employees have limited bargaining power at the firm level,
often there is no wage drift and employees receive only the nationally agreed minimum wage
for the sector; this is largely the situation in our case. In 2000 union density in the retail trade
sector was 56%, while the gross national average was around 75 % (Bockerman and Uusitalo,
2006). However in Finland agreements are generally binding, which means that the wages of
non-union workers are also determined by union agreements. Finally, it is important to note
that employers cannot dismiss employees at will. In Finland, mass lay-offs are possible only
when employers can demonstrate an economic or technological reason, but even this
procedure involves extensive negotiations with employee representatives. Individuallay-offs
are possible only in the case of gross misconduct, such as theft. Thus even retail employees
enjoy considerable job security.
Our case is a Finnish firm in the non-food retailing sector. It has 47 retail outlets around
Finland, making it one of the largest retail firms in Finland. Each outlet sells similar items,
although there is variation in the number of items sold, since the outlets are of different size
ranging from floor space of 542 m2 to 3697 m2. Smaller establishments carry a product
assortment that is a subset of the product mix offered by larger stores. Each outlet is divided
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intofive departments: cosmetics, clothing, shoes, electronics and home appliances, and sports.
The retailer is neither a discount retailer nor can it be considered as a specialized or upscale
retailer. Its strategy is to sell rather standard products to a wide range of customers with all
items in stock on display, and self-service is the main form of service in many departments.
For the bulk of employees the main tasks are to receive goods, shelve items, and maintain the
appearance of their department. In departments such as electronics and sports, it appears that
customers are apt to call on the expertise of sales clerks more often than in other departments
such as clothing.
To help to sharpen the hypotheses that we will derive from the preceding conceptual
discussion and also inform our statistical analysis, we endeavored to enrich our understanding
of the institutional realities at the case. To this end we read various materials that the
company provided such as the HR handbook. We have also spent considerable time on field
trips including multiple visits to two (of the 47) outlets of this company in different areas of
Finland; during each of these visits we interviewed the store manager and four employees.
We have also made repeated visits to the firm headquarters where we have had extensive
discussions with senior personnel. Many of these personnel had made frequent and recent
visits to branch stores and thus had intimate knowledge of these branches.
All the units share a similar formal set of HRM policies. These are described in the
company's HRM handbook and include an emphasis on training and skill formation, policies
concerning meetings between employees and supervisors and annual development
discussions. For the most part when reading this handbook one gets the sense that the firm is
quite traditional and that relatively few novel HRM practices are present. However, as is the
case in the bank examined by Bartel (2004), store managers and department supervisors have
discretion in implementation of the HRM practices. As was confirmed by our visits and
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discussions, what this means in practice, is that substantial variation in HRM environments
exists within the case.
Our investigations showed that work is organized in team-like units, the departments.
Employees within sales departments behave team-like in the sense that each employee is
trained to perform multiple tasks within the department, and one salesperson may substitute
for another when needed. However, no formal authority is transferred to teams. At the same
time, sales personnel have individual responsibility for certain products including having
discretion in the display of products. In such ways employees participate in substantive
decisions. Employee skills are acquired through in-house or on-the-job training and the
company operates its own training institute. Supervisors may enroll employees in a course
that the institute offers, or the employees may themselves suggest courses. These skills help
the employees in managing their products and thus in participation in decision making.
Furthermore, as a by-product of participation in training programs, team spirit and
commitment to shared goals is fostered.
The HRM handbook requires that supervisors and employees should have regular
meetings (typically weekly or bi-weekly), where issues related to the day to day operations of
the departments are discussed. This is an important channel of information from the
supervisors to employees and vice versa. Employees get information that helps them to plan
their own work ahead. Employees also receive group feedback at these meetings about their
collective performance. At the individual level, there is also a policy of annual development
discussions. The items discussed in development talks usually relate to how employees have
performed in their jobs, how they could further improve, what training needs they have, and
what kind of future prospects they have within the store. Arguably these discussions provide
an important channel for non-monetary rewards in the form of managerial recognition. An
important aspect of these talks is discussion of possible promotions. Supervisors are typically
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chosen from the ranks of the salespersons, and promotion to supervisor would increase both
pay and status considerably. Thus development talks are both an important element in overall
HRM policies and also of substantial interest to employees. However, in practice there is
considerable variation in the implementation of this policy. For instance, in one store we
visited only 35 % of employees had participated in development talks in 2003. But in another
store, the corresponding percentage was 93 %.
Finally, only managerial employees are entitled to incentive pay and shop-floor
employees get the nationally negotiated fixed wage. 8Therefore, motivating shop-floor
employees to put forth discretionary effort must rely mainly on intrinsic motivation,
managerial recognition and promotions.
In our store visits, we asked managers and employees how company salespersons can
influence store productivity. One oftwo broad categories of reasons9 frequently mentioned by
both groups was shelf-management, item display, and the overall appearance of the store.
During the study period, employees within sales departments had a lot of discretion
concerning item display. In turn this influences the lay-out ofthe store, which potentially has
a large impact on sales. Furthermore, the overall cleanliness and orderliness of the store
affects the ability of customers to achieve their objectives in the store (Bitner 1992). To give a
concrete example, if items are not shelved in their proper places in the clothing department,
customers may be unable to find what they are looking for. Since employees are responsible
for given products, their motivation and skills in organizing and managing products
efficiently affects the store's productivity. Formal models of shelf management are complex
and if market conditions are rapidly changing the value ofthese kinds of models is diminished
(see e.g. Borin and Farris 1995). This is an additional argument that benefits flow from
employee involvement in shelf management decisions, especially if information systems are
not utilized extensively as is the case in this firm during the time period under study.
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The other set of reasons concerns interaction with customers. In this chain, employees do
not usually initiate such contacts. However, when employees are in the store and engaged in
other activities (e.g. shelving), often they are approached by customers who are looking for
specific products or who want more product information. In such situations, employee
reactions have an important bearing on customer satisfaction. If an employee behaves in an
unfriendly manner, customer interest may be easily lost. Similarly, employee knowledge
(whether the employee actually can respond to the customer questions) potentially has an
important impact on customers and thus ultimately on store sales. Bell and Menguc (2002,
140-141) highlight the role of job autonomy, empowerment, and information on customer-
oriented behavior. They also show that increased customer-orientation leads to increased
customer perceptions of service quality.
Based on the preceding discussion we believe that our case is a good one in which to test
several hypotheses derived from the literature on the impact of novel HRM practices and
performance. These include hypotheses derived from the framework proposed by Appelbaum
et al. (2000) who stress the complementary natures of skill, employee involvement and
employee motivation in helping to account for differences in business performance. Our case
has some individual practices and policies that are non-traditional such as those designed to
encourage employee involvement. Since the implementation of these practices varies widely
across establishments, we can investigate hypotheses concerning the impact on business
performance of these individual elements. In addition, since there are large differences in the
overall HR environment across branches, we can test hypotheses concerning the impact of
different HR environments on business performance.
Furthermore, from our field-work and interviews we conclude that, typically, interactions
between customers and employees are very brief and not very personalized. Hence we would
expect that product knowledge would be a more important form of firm-specific human
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capital than is personalized knowledge of customers, although general knowledge about
customer preference is certainly very valuable. In other words, the size and strength of the
link between those HR policies and practices that promote knowledge and business
performance may not be as strong as would otherwise be the case. Also, since shop-floor
employees receive a fixed wage, employee motivation must flow from intrinsic rather then
extrinsic rewards. In sum, we expect that store productivity depends, among other things, on
employee motivation and knowledge, that both of these parameters can be influenced by
HRM practices and that this will be so in the more successful outlets in our case.
At the same time our fieldtrips and discussions with managers revealed that there are also
a number of crucial differences in the environments that different stores face. For example,
the local labor markets facing individual outlets are rather different. In buoyant economic
areas such as the Helsinki area, employee turnover is a significant problem for the company,
while in more rural areas, which typically have high unemployment, usually employees are
more attached to the employer. Although the company has the same formal set of HRM
policies throughout its outlets, differences in local labor markets may require different
applications of informal HRM practices. In our empirical work, to control for differences in
local labor markets and the consequences for output, we will include controls such as tenure
and the share of full time workers. It is also clear that different outlets confront other sharp
environmental differences, notably differences in competitive pressures. Again in our
empirical work we will include controls that attempt to capture such disparities.
IV The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data cover all 47 establishments in the case firm that were operating during 2001-
2003. Of these 47 establishments, 37 are observed for the whole period, while the remaining
ten started operations between March 2001 and February 2003. No establishments closed
during 2001-2003. Our data consists of 36 monthly observations (200 I: 1 to 2003: 12). Since
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we do not know the number of days a new store operated during the first month (a store could
be opened at the end of month), and the first month may be special in other ways as well, we
treated observations for the first month of operations as missing for all new establishments.
Another way we cleaned the data was to exclude 11 observations which preliminary analysis
identified as influential or outliers.lo
The definition of productivity in the retail sector has been subject to much debate (see,
e.g. Reardon et aI., 1996). However, value added has been widely accepted as the
theoretically preferred measure of retail productivity and fortunately we are able to use such a
measure as the dependent variable. Essentially this is defined as net sales minus purchases. 11
The core input measures we use are quite traditional, namely hours worked and floor space
area. Both of these measures have been used in prior studies (e.g., Reardon et aI., 1996, 447.)
To capture key facets of the HR environment we use six HRM variables all of which
come from a personnel survey that is administered annually by an independent consulting
firm.12 We received the data directly from the case firm. The survey respondents are the sales
clerks at the departments, who are mainly permanently employed but who may work either
part-time of full-time. As such respondents correspond to the definition of "core" employees
as defined by Osterman (1994). The average response rate is around 60 %.
One key practice for which we have data concerns development talks, which are
supposedly held annually and usually in the spring. Our measure "Development talks" is the
share of employees who have gone through development talks (with either their supervisor or
their manager). There is substantial variation in this measure: while in most stores in most
years all or almost all respondents indicate that they have had a development talk with their
superior, in about a third of stores there are years when fewer than 50% of respondents had
had these talks. These numbers were particularly low in the last year of the sample (2003),
perhaps suggesting that commitment to this practice tends to wear out over time.
15
In a similar vein to Bartel (2004) the other five HR measures we use are employee
perceptions of different HR practices. For these variables each observation corresponds to the
relative frequency of a response. As with the measure of development talks, the available data
indicate much dispersion in these measures across establishments. The first perceptual
measure attempts to capture the opportunity to participate in substantive decisions, which
theory suggests potentially is an important driver of business performance. "Participation on
the job" is measured by the mean ofthe answers to the statement "1 can participate in
planning and development of my work" and is measured on a five point Likert-scale ranging
from "disagree strongly" to "completely agree". Other variables are measured similarly.
Theory also suggests that effective decision making participation requires not only
appropriate channels but also adequate and appropriate information. "Information sharing" is
the mean of the answers to the statement "I get enough information that is needed to manage
in my job".
Earlier it was also argued that information concerning the performance of the group is
important for employees' effort decisions. This is captured by the measure "Performance
feedback" which measures managerial attention to performance, and is the mean of answers
to the statement "Our department has adequate performance measurement systems". Our
theoretical framework also suggests that managerial recognition and confidence in
management is an important incentive for the employees to put forth discretionary effort. To
capture this aspect of the HRM environment "Acknowledgement" is defined as "I get
acknowledgement from my supervisor when 1perform well in my job." Finally "Shared
goals" is defined as "We try to reach together with my supervisor the goals that have been
set". All perceptual variables exhibit much variation, typically from around 2.5 to 4.5, the
mean being around 4. To assess how much the HRM measures vary over time for given
establishments we calculated the share of within variance of the total variance for the 39
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estab lishments observed in all of the three years 13. The shares range from 24 % for
performance feedback to 52 % for the development talks. This means that there are
considerable changes over time in the HRM measures for given establishments. Furthermore,
we tried to assess how much of the changes in the HRM measures can be attributed to the
survey response rates. To do this we calculated within variances of the HRM measures for
each establishment. We then regressed the within variance of each HRM variable on the
average response rate. We find no evidence that the average response rate would have an
impact on the within variance of the HRM measures. In other words, there is no evidence that
establishments with high response rates would have less variability in the HRM measures
over time.
Also we wish to capture differences in overall HR environments across establishments.
Reflecting the absence of a standard approach in the literature, we will pursue two methods.
One way to do this, as in Bartel (2004) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001), is by introducing
all elements simultaneously into regression models. However such an approach is likely to be
characterized by high correlation between the perceptual measures, and thus a problem for
precise estimation of these parameters is created. (In fact the simple correlation coefficients
for our 5 perceptual measures range from 0.50 to 0.69). The problem of collinearity of the
HRM variables has been noted in many studies. For example, in the seminal paper of
Ichniowski et al. (1997), they argue that the collinearity of workplace innovations means that
they cannot be entered together in regression models. Furthermore, they maintain that
estimation of a full set of interaction variables is also impractical and that such variables may
also suffer from collinearity. To get around these problems they identify bundles of practices
inspecting the distributions of the variables and by using scaling algorithms. Then they create
dummy variables depicting different combinations of practices.
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Another response to the problem of collinearity is found in influential studies including
Huselid and Becker (1996), MacDuffie (1995) and Huselid (1995), who have used scales, or
various summary measures, to describe the HRM environment.14 We will build on this line of
work and also create a scale which we use in our regression analysis.
Since establishments operate in different parts of the country, there are large differences in
operating environments-for example, stores in the capital region have quite different
markets when compared to those operating in rural areas. We control for these differences by
using a wide range of variables depicting the operating environment. Important characteristics
of the environment include population density, net income, net migration, home ownership,
the share of the highly educated, the number of establishments operating in retailing per
capita, and the average turnover of establishments operating in retailing. These environmental
variables are measured at the municipality level and the environmental data (obtained from
Statistics Finland) reveal considerable variation in these environmental variables (Table 1.)15
Much previous work also indicates that the characteristics of personnel may also affect
productivity (see, e.g., Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999; IImakunnas et aI., 2004). Fortunately,
and most unusually, our data enable us to control for many crucial personnel features
including the share of male employees, the shares of permanent part time, permanent full
time, and temporary employees, and average tenure.16 From Table 1 we see that the work
force is predominantly female, and that there are a lot of part-timers. It is also apparent that
around 70% of employees have a permanent work contract, meaning that the majority of
employees enjoy considerable job security. However, the personnel figures are for all the
employees, including personnel at the cash registers. For this reason the figures probably
over-estimate the share of part-timers and underestimate the share of permanent employees in
the average establishment. Average tenure is 6.7 years and thus quite high. This implies that,
on average, employees have had considerable time for on-the-job learning.
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Finally, managerial quality may be expected to affect to affect business performance and
yet managerial turnover is unlikely to be time invariant. In fact, of the 47 establishments in
our case, 18 experience a change in management. During the period of study, twelve units
change their manager once, four do so twice, and the remaining two have three changes,
Fortunately, our data enable us to control for managerial turnover across retail units by
including monthly manager dummies in our empirical estimates.
[TABLE 1]
V. Empirical Strategy and Findings
In order to use all of the available data, in particular monthly observations on
performance, our basic empirical strategy is to estimate production functions. After discussing
issues relating to that method we present our findings. To check on the robustness of our key
findings, we also report findings from additional empirical work including exercises relating
to questions of exogeneity and possible timing issues related to the nature of our data.
The starting point of the analysis is the following augmented Cobb-Douglas'? production
function
Y,my = A,myS,ya (EL,my)P
Where Y,mymeasures production of the unit i at time month m and year y, A/my represents
productivity shocks, SlY is the floor space, and ELmlY is effective labor. The level of effective
labor depends on the HRM policies and the composition of the workforce, and we write it as
P'llIi.IlIiIiM +P j'HRSONNFr,' h H . h b fh k d Thfollows: EL = H e' 1", were, IS t e num er 0 ours wor e, euny Imy Imy
productivity shock can be decomposed into a permanent effect, time effects, and other shocks
which vary over time and over establishments. Since the plant manager may have an effect on
productivity, we also include management dummies in the productivity shock, We specify the
d
,.
h k A PmMON7H+P,.'YFAR+P"wMANAGHR,m,,+v,H,m,' W ' II I II thpro uCtlVlty s oc s as /my= e '. e WI a so a ow e
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environmental variables to enter the equation, possibly through £,my'Taking logs of the
augmented production function we get
Y,my = f3h,my+ as;y + 13, f3'HIIMHRM,y + 13. f3'pPERSONNEL,y
+ f3eENVIRONMENT;y + f3ma'MANAGER,my + f3m'MONTH + f3y'YEAR + v, + G,my
where YmlY is the logarithm of value added in establishment i at month m, year Y; himy is the
log of hours worked, ~iyis the log of floor area; HRM,y is a vector describing the human
resource management environment measured annually; PERSONNEL,y is a vector describing
the composition of work force, ENVIRONMENT,y is a vector measuring the operating
environment of the establishment, MANAGER,my is a vector of manager dummies, MONTH is
a vector month dummies capturing seasonal effects, YEAR is a vector of year dummies
capturing the effects common to all establishments in a given year, v, is the establishment
level unobservable component, and G,myis an error term.
Several issues arise in the estimation of the preceding equation. One matter is how to
handle the establishment level unobservable component when it is likely that establishment
level unobserved factors may affect the choices regarding HRM, even though we have a large
set of controls. We allow the explanatory variables to be correlated with v, , the establishment
specific error term and use establishment fixed effects to control for time invariant
establishment characteristics.
A second issue concerns the calculation of standard errors where the need to adjust the
standard errors for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in fixed effects models recently
has been emphasized.1s Although estimators which take into account these features of the
error term have been around at least since the work of Arellano (1987), until recently they
have not been widely used.19 Fortunately research by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Kezdi (2004)
shows that these estimators also perform well in small samples. Furthermore, Kezdi (2004)
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shows that the number of cross section units is the important one, and not the ratio ofN and
T. In other words, for these estimators to perform well in small samples, it is not needed that
the cross section dimension is large relative to the time dimension. Thus, we can be confident
that using an asymptotic approximation is a reasonable procedure.
A third issue is the high correlation ofthe variables in the HRM vector. As discussed
earlier, to respond to this matter we will pursue two strategies. First we will follow one set of
intluentialliterature (e.g. Cappelli and Neumark, 200 I) and estimate all elements in the HRM
vector simultaneously in regression models. Then we will conduct an F test on the joint
significance of the vector ofHRM variables. As is the usual practice in the literature (e.g.
Bartel, 2004) we will include the mean values of these variables in our regressions?O Second,
by using principal component analysis, we create a summary measure of the HRM practices.
In constructing an additional scale for the HRM variables we exclude development talks,
since the first principal component puts least weight on this variable?1 The resulting scale has
five components and Cronbach's alpha of 0.88. 22 Thus this variable is a measure of the
overall HRM environment.
Having decided on the appropriate specifications, the next issue that arises is how we will
interpret the results. Since we are conditioning on the establishment effect, the interpretation
of the parameters comes from the conditional expectation of Y,my on the explanatory variables
and the establishment level unobservable component V" The parameters can be given a causal
interpretation if the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with
past, present and future error terms &,my . If the HRM variables are correlated with only the
time-invariant part of the error term (v,), then their coefficients can be interpreted as causal.
To address these issues we will perform tests of the strict exogeneity assumption. In the fixed
effect estimation we use, this leads to our including forward values of the HRM variables as
additional covariates. If these variables are found to be significant in the equation, the
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assumption of strict exogeneity will not hold (see, e.g. Wooldridge (2002), 284-285).
Intuitively, the forward values of the HRM variables can only be significant if there is
feedback from the error term at time t to the HRM variables at time t+ 1. The results of these
tests are discussed along with the estimation results.
While we expect that our preferred estimates will be our fixed effects specifications, first
we report OLS estimates. These may be informative since they also exploit the cross sectional
variation in the data, whereas the fixed effects models use only variation within
establishments. The results are reported in Table 3. The first column gives the baseline
specification without any HRM variables. To test hypotheses concerning the sign and
significance of individual HR practices, the next six columns enter the seven HRM variables
one at a time. In the last column, we report estimates that includes all six HRM measures. By
first entering the variables one at a time and then together as a set, we are following the usual
practice in the literature as, for example, in Cappelli and Neumark (200 I) and Bartel (2004).
[TABLE 2]
From Table 2 it is seen that both of the core inputs, hours and floor space, are found to be
statistically significant at customary levels and that the coefficients are of expected
magnitude. Turning to the composition ofthe workforce, surprisingly we find that
establishments with a higher share of full time workers are less productive (and relative to the
omitted category, the share of temporary workers.) At the same time, establishments with
higher average tenure are found be more productive so these results may reflect
multicollinearity between these two variables. The gender composition of the establishment is
not found to be a significant predictor of productivity. Similarly, and perhaps surprisingly, the
operating environment variables are also all found to be statistically insignificant, with the
exception of the density of retail establishments in the community where the establishment is
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located. However this finding occurs only when all HR practices are entered together, that is
in the results reported in the last column.
Turning to the HRM variables we find that when they are entered separately, all the HRM
variables are found to have positive coefficients and most (the exceptions being information
sharing and acknowledgement) are statistically significant. Thus the findings reported in
columns 2-7 provide support for diverse hypotheses, including the views that establishments
with more participation on the job, greater use of development talks, more performance
feedback, and practices that provide for better goal alignment between the different parties are
expected to be more productive. The most precise OLS results are obtained for development
talks which are statistically significant at the I % level.
However, when all the HRM variables are entered together, from the result reported in
column (8) of Table 2 we see that only one variable remains statistically significant at
conventional levels, namely the measure of development talks. But as noted, many of the
individual HRM practices are strongly correlated; when all are separately and simultaneously
included in the same model it is difficult to estimate the parameters of the correlated variables
very precisely. Our hypothesis that the HRM variables have positive performance effects is
supported by an F-test comparing the full specification with a specification omitting all HRM
variables. This test suggests that the null hypothesis that the HRM variables have no
economic effects can be rejected at the 5% level of confidence.23
Next, we replace individual HRM practices with our summary scale of HRM practices
(column 9). Consistent with the hypothesis that HRM matters for performance, the scale gets
a positive coefficient that is significant, albeit only at a 10 % level. In column 10, where we
include development talks, only that variable is significant at conventional levels, but the
scale is not. In sum, the OLS results provide somewhat mixed evidence on the importance of
HRM variables.
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Since the OLS results may be biased by time invariant unobservable differences between
establishments, we also estimate fixed effects models. Table 3 reports findings from those
specifications in which we include two sets of fixed effects-for establishments and
managers-as well as dummy variables for each month and year.24 Reassuringly we find that
the establishment dummies are found to be jointly significantly different from zero, as are the
management dummies. Hence it is the findings in Table 3 that are preferred to those reported
in Table 2.
[TABLE 3]
From Table 3 we see that, of the two basic inputs, only the log of hours is statistically
significant and that the coefficient is smaller than in the OLS estimates. That the capital
coefficients are insignificant is not altogether surprising, since the within transformation
procedure uses only variation within establishments to identify the parameters. Conditional on
the establishment fixed effects, the log of space does not have any predictive power since it
evolves slowly over time. Also the low values for the input coefficients, especially for capital,
are not unusual in a fixed effects context (see, e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1999). Also the
variables depicting the quality of labor force are all found to be statistically insignificant.
Importantly the addition of firm and management fixed effects means that we do not find (as
in Table 2) that establishments with a higher share of full time workers are less productive
(relative to the omitted category, the share of temporary workers.) In general, the operating
environment variables are found to be insignificant with the exception of net migration and, in
some specifications, net income and the density of retail establishments relative to population.
Net migration has a positive sign in all estimates. The other two variables are marginally
significant in some specifications.
Next we examine findings for the HRM variables, beginning first with the specifications
when they are entered one at a time. Column 2 suggests that information sharing has a strong
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positive effect on sales. The standard deviation of this variable is 0.35 which means that a one
standard deviation increase in this variable would lead to approximately a 2.9% increase in
value added. Participation on the job has also a positive and statistically significant effect on
value added, which is of similar magnitude to the impact of information sharing. This is
consistent with the hypothesized effects of participation on employee motivation and learning
about the content of their job. Performance feedback has a positive significant coefficient,
with an impact that is of a similar magnitude to the other significant variables. The variable
"acknowledgement from supervisor" has a very small positive coefficient, and it is not found
to be statistically significant. Shared goals, as reported in column 7, is also found to have a
positive coefficient. Taken together the variables depicting feedback on performance are
consistent with Bartel's (2004) results for banking. Her results show that feedback on
performance has positive effects on performance in banking.
Column 8 reports findings when all the HRM variables are entered simultaneously.
Importantly, on the basis of an F test we find that the variables in the HRM vector are jointly
significantly different from zero.25 However, the findings on individual elements in the HRM
vector change somewhat when all the variables are entered simultaneously. While the
coefficients are quite stable, as expected, all coefficients decrease somewhat and the standard
errors are much larger and none of the variables remains statistically significant at
conventional levels. As already noted, the increase in the standard errors is probably due to
the strong correlation between the HRM variables (and similar results have been reported by
Cappelli & Neumark, 2001). The fact that the F-test is so strongly significant also supports
this view. Compared to the simple OLS results it appears that the fixed effect results for HRM
variables are not strongly driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
The last two columns use the scale to describe the HRM environment. This HRM scale
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Since its standard deviation is roughly
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0.8, its impact on productivity is close to 3%, which is an economically significant amount.
Finally, in the last column of Table 3 we enter the variable "development talks"
simultaneously with the HRM scale, and we find that the coefficient for the HRM scale is
basically unaffected, while the coefficient for development talks is insignificant. The results
suggest that when HR environments have high overall scores concerning information sharing,
participation in decision making, performance feedback, acknowledgement, and shared goals,
this will lead to better performance.
The first robustness check we perform reflects the fact that our data comprise a mix of
variables that vary by month (such as value added and hours) and other variables that vary
annually. Since this presents a potential timing problem, in Table 4 we report findings based
on models in which we aggregate the performance data to an annual basis.
[Table 4]
Considering first the results in specifications in which we enter only one HRM
variable at a time (and reported in columns 1-7), it is seen that often the sign and the
magnitude of the coefficients reported in Table 4 are similar to those reported earlier in Table
3. For instance, the coefficient of information sharing is essentially the same. However, the
coefficients for on-the-job participation and performance feedback decline somewhat and now
they are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficient for shared goals
increases and is now significant at a 5% level of confidence. In the last two columns of Table
4 we report findings that use the scale that describes the HRM environment. Most
reassuringly, the coefficients for the HRM scale are essentially unaltered from those reported
in Table 3 although, reflecting a smaller number of observations, the t-statistics decline.
Furthermore, when the variable "development talks" is entered simultaneously with the HRM
scale again, as in Table 3, we find that the coefficient for the HRM scale is basically
unaffected, while the coefficient for development talks is insignificant.
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The second robustness check stems from whether or not we can give a causal
interpretation to the HRM variables and which, in turn, depends on whether or not the
assumption of strict exogeneity is met. This assumption is tested by including future values of
the HRM variables in the regressions reported in columns 1-8 in Table 5 where the analysis,
as in Table 3, is based on monthly performance data. In the models where the variables are
entered individually we include the 12 months forward value of the given HRM variable in
the equation. The forward value was chosen to be 12 months forward because the variation in
that variable takes place annualll6. While in the main these additional variables are found to
have statistically insignificant coefficients, the coefficient for the forward value of
development talks is statistically significant. This suggests that prior productivity shocks have
a feedback effect with development talks. With this exception, it appears that the HRM
variables do not violate the assumption of strict exogeneity. The coefficients of some of the
HRM variables are notably higher when compared to Table 3. This is because we are
essentially estimating the model using only the years 200 I and 2002. In other words, we
would get the same results for the HRM variables if we ran the model using only years 2001
and 2002.
[Table 5]
VI Conclusions
By assembling a large and most unusual panel data set from a large Finnish retail firm, we
provide the most reliable evidence to date for the retail industry of the impact of human
resource management practices on firm performance. Our performance data are most unusual-
-monthly financial and performance data for the period 2001-2003 and for 47 all retail units in
the case. These are combined with information for crucial aspects of HRM environments that
are obtained from annual employee surveys and include data on employee participation, goal
alignment and information sharing. Our rich data also include controls for crucial features of
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the operating environment and important dimensions of core inputs, notably labor, as well as
a measure of output, value added, that is theoretically preferred. Our main empirical approach
is to estimate augmented production functions using panel data methods that include both
establishment and manager fixed effects (as well as month and year dummies) and which are
augmented by different specifications of the HRM environment, and including some measures
of the overall HRM climate that are derived from principal component analysis.
In general we find evidence that the HRM environment matters to business performance.
This is the case across a variety of specifications, including both pooled OLS models and
fixed effect models that include both establishment and manager fixed effects (as well as
month and year dummies) both when HRM variables are entered separately or as a set.
Importantly, in a model that includes the set of HRM variables, an F test indicates that the
variables in the HRM vector are jointly significantly different from zero. And when we
include a summary scale to represent the HRM variables, we find that this scale is also
significant. Specifically we find that a one standard deviation increase of the scale would lead
to approximately 3 per cent higher productivity. Importantly, our key findings survive
exogeneity tests and additional exercises we undertake to investigate possible timing issues
related to the nature of our data.
Empirical research on the productivity impact of HRM has been relatively sparse. While
some previous studies have found considerable gains from participatory HRM practices (in
particular Batt, 1999, 2002, and Bartel, 2004), other researchers have been more skeptical.
They have also questioned whether innovative HRM can be expected to matter much in
settings where relatively low-skilled employees do fairly routine tasks. Our empirical findings
provide much more solid support than was previously available for those who hypothesize
that novel HRM practices can be expected to be associated with enhanced business
28
performance, even in settings where employee tasks are fairly simple and employees are
relatively low-skilled, and in a setting that is outside North America.
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TABLEt
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Standard deviation
Inputs and Outputs
Log Value added 1471 7.82 0.46
Log Hours 1467 8.90 0.33
Log Space (m2) 1471 7.51 0.38
Personnel
Share of male workers 1471 0.13 0.05
Share of permanent part time workers 1471 0.49 0.12
Share of permanent full time workers 1471 0.21 0.06
Share of temporary workers 1471 0.31 0.11
Average tenure (years) 1471 6.68 3.27
Environment
Population density 1471 0.42 0.58
Net migration 1471 0.00 0.01
Net income 1471 0.11 0.01
Share of highly educated 1471 0.10 0.03
Home ownership 1471 0.56 0.06
Retail establishments/habitants 1471 0.01 0.00
Average turnover of retail establishments 1471 0.01 0.00
HRM
Information sharing 1471 3.78
Participation on the job 1471 3.85
Development talks 1471 0.81
Performance feedback 1471 3.99
Supervisor acknowledgement 1471 3.89
Shared goals 1471 4.27
Principal component score 1 1471 0.00
Principal component score 2 1471 0.00
Principal component score 3 1471 0.00
Principal component score 4 1471 0.00
Scale 1471 0.00
Notes. I) See Section IV for details of the HRM variable definitions.
2) All monetary values are in real terms and measured in euros. The deflator is monthly
consumer price index, where Jan. 2000= I00.
3) Population density=population (in thousands)/area
Net migration= (net internal migration+immigration-emigration)/population
Net income=net taxable income (in hundreds ofthousands)/population
Highly educated means persons having a university degree.
Average turnover of retail establishments is in hundreds of millions of euros.
0.35
0.36
0.22
0.34
0.42
0.36
1.90
1.00
0.76
0.61
0.83
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TABLE 2
The Impact of HRM on Productivity: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Hours 0.863"""* 0.853*** 0.849"''''''' 0.856*** 0.838*** 0.859*** 0.858*** 0.836*** 0.846**'" 0.844*"
[1158] [1115] [1140] [10.87] [1102] [11.23] [11.32] [1108J [10.95J [10.82]
Log Space 0.178** 0.190*** 0,181
***
0.168** 0.185*** 0.185** 0.180" 0.170" 0.189*** 0.177"*
[262] [2.84] [281] [2.50] [2.83] [2.67J [2.68J [2.53] [2.87] [2.73]
Share of maJe workers 0.292 0.289 0.374 0327 0.362 0.301 0292 0416 0.33 0.35
[0.80) [0.78] [0.96] [0.87] [0.92J [0.81] [0.77] [101) [0.85] [0.90]
Shareof part time workers 0.058 0.06 0.054 0.046 0.076 0052 0.049 0.06 0.056 0.046
[049] [050J [045] [044J [0.64] [045] [041] [0.55] [047] [043]
Share of ful1 time workers
-O.678"'*'" -0.683*** -0.721*** .0742*** -0.655*** -O.687*"'* -0.687*** .0.735*** -0.691"'" -0.743*"
[2.84] [2.85] [3.10] [3.20] [2.73] [2.80) [2.85] [3.24J [2.87] [3.25]
Average tenure (months) 0.014** 0 013 ** 0.015** 0.014*** 0.014** 0.013** 0 013 ** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.013"[242] [2.24] [260] [2.72] [233J [237] [2.34J [2.71] [2.32] [2.60]
Population density -0.025 -0.026 -0.032 -0015 -0027 -003 -003 -002 -0.031 -0021
[051J [0.52] [064J [0.29J [0.55] [0.60] [0.59] [0.37] [0.62J [039]
Net migration
-2101 -2.593 -2.527 -1401 -2.885 -2252 -2559 -2088 -2.833
-2
[054J [0.65] [0.64) [037) [073) [057] [063) [0.53J [0.70] [0.51)
Net income -3.545 -2.924 -2262 -2973 -2032 -2939 -2855 -1653 -2.103 -2.028
[I 56] [I 26) [I 03) [148] [0.84] [I 31] 1123] [O.77J [0.91] [0.97]
Share of hIghly educated 0446 043 0.365 0417 0444 0392 0527 0398 0425 0.406
[038J [0.37] [0.33] [0.40] [0.38] [0.34) [0.45] [O.39J [0.37] [0.39]
Home ownerhip -0.07 -0.054 -0.154 -0.052 -0068 -0088 -0.043 -0098 -0.08 -0.061
[0.14] [011] [032] [0.11] [013] [017] [009] [021] [0.16] [013]
Retail establishments/habitants
-27 093 -29.394 -30.611 -33.656* -29.177 -26.168 -26.249 -35 558* -28.683 -33.983*
[1.39J [151J [158J [177] [152J [1.37] [1.38] [195] [149J [181]
Average turnover of retal! establishme J.731 1967 3281 0.317 6418 3568 3367 4.17 4.698 2.576
[014] [0.16] [029] [003J [0.54J [0.30] [029] [0.36] [041] [022J
Information sharing 0.044 -0.015
[114] [0.31]
PartIcipation on the job 0.084** 0.045
[235] [096]
Development talks 0.163*"'* 0 139** 0.143**
[283] [215] [2.27]
Perfonnance feedback 0.086* 0063
[1.70] [I 14]
Supervisor acknowledgement 0.037
-0.01
[115] [028]
Shared goals 0 053
*
0
[J.7°J [OOOJ
Scale 0.034* 0.024
[1.90J [1.23]
Observations 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467
R-squared 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.866 0.863 0.862 0862 0867 0.863 0.867
Number of establishments 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Notes. I) Coefficients are reported in the table and t-statistics in brackets.
2) Sigmficance of the varibles is indicated as foHows:
*
significant at 10%~
**
significant at 5%;
***
significant at 1%
3) The t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within each establishment
4) The specifications mclude a constant as well as month and year dummies
5) R-squared is unadjusted
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TABLE 3
The Impact of HRM on Productivity; Estimates Including Establishment Fixed Effects and Mana~er Dummies
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Hours 0.263*** 0.266"""* 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.261
**'"
0.264*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.267"'** 0.267***
[9.59] [9.90] [9.99J [953J [965J [9.58J [964] [10.10] [9.73] [9.70]
Log Space 0.075 0074 0.054 0.062 0.025 0.074 0.065 0.031 0.048 0.Q4
[092J [0.93J [068J [0.77] [0.29J [0.88] [O.72J [OAO] [0.55] [0.48J
Shareof male workers 0381 033 0.241 0.349 0.372 0.355 0.253 0.281 0.217 0.202
[I.IOJ [O.96J [0.80] [0.98J [1.20J [1.01] [0.70J [0.90J [0.68J [0.62J
Shareof part time workers 0062 0.013 0.003 0.067 0.054 0.05 0.032 0.021 -0.004 0.002
[063J [0 13J [0.03] [0.69J [0.54J [050J [031 J [021J [004J [0.02]
Shareof full time workers 0.173 0.174 0.1]4 0.067 0.] 15 0.151 o. ]66 0.059 0.106 0.037
[039J [OAOJ [0.27] [0.16J [0.26J [0.35J [0.35J [0.]6J [023J [0.09]
Average tenure (months) 0.039 0.034 0.036 0.035 0038 0.04 0041 0029 0039 0.037
[1.49J [129J [1.45J [137J [IA7] [1.54J [1.53J [1.I4J [1.48J [1.40]
Population density 1.287 2.954 3.657 2.223 2199 IAI2 1.673 4.611 2.973 3.531
[0.31 J [0.72J [089J [052] [0.52] [0.34] [OAOJ [I 15] [0.71] [0.84]
Net migration % 5.604** 5.815** 6098*'" 6085*** 5.888** 5.486** 5.237** 6.698*** 5.478" 5.807"
[2.55] [2.53J [2.64J [271] [2.34] [2.36] [2.31 J [2.94] [2.23] [2.35]
Net income 4A27 12.325' 12.809' 3.784 8.968 4.745 6.805 14.828' 11.675 10.941
[0.63J [1.71 J [1.77J [0.55] [I 19] [0.67] [092J [1.94] [1.56] [1.45)
Share of highly educated -3.104 -1.802 -2.149 -2.291 -3.14 -3.907 -2761 OA47 -3.458 -2.897
[OA7J [0.31J [0.33] [0.34J [048J [0.60] [0.42J [0.08J [0.55J [OA6]
Home ownerhip % 0.02 0.158 0023 0.296 0.152 -0076 -0.077 0.609 -0.101 0.089
[0.03J [0.22J [004J [038J [0.23J [0.10] [0.11] [071J [0.14J [0.11]
Retail establishments/habitants 72.638' 54.504 64039 87747" 46.983 74385' 57.722 53043 526 63.588
[1.87J [1.63J [I 65] [2.13J [I.17J [1.86J [1.33] [1.04J [1.36J [1.49J
Averageturnover of retail establishments
-6269 -14.997 -14.485 -2.53 -6042 -6968 -3.841 -10.557 -10.1 -7A28
[0.26J [0.72] [0.66] [O.IOJ [029J [029J [0.17J [054J [0.48J [0.34]
Information sharing 0,082*** 0.062
[332J [1.66J
ParticIpatIOn on the job 0,077*** 0.028
[2.79) [062J
Development talks 0059 0.058 0.04
[I 43J [1I5J [0.99]
Performance feedback 0081' 0.039
[187J [O.92J
Supervisor acknowledgement 0012 -0022
[0 50J [0 61J
Shared goals 0.034' 0.005
[181) [017]
Scale 0.037" 0.035"
[2.67] [241]
Observations 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467
R-squared 0.864 0866 0.866 0.864 0.865 0.864 0864 0.867 0.866 0.866
Number of establishments 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Notes. I) Coefficients are reported in the table and t-statistics in brackets
2) Significance of the varibles ISindicated as follows:
*
significant at 10%;
**
significant at 5%; *",..significant at 1%
3)The t-statJstlcsare robust to heteroscedasticlty and autocorrelation withm each establishment
4) The specifications Include a constant, manager dummies,and month and year dummies
5) R-squared is the unadjusted WithinR-squared
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TABLE 4
The Iml)8ct of HRM on Productivity lJsin~ Annual Data: Fixed Effects & Mana2er Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Hours 0,554*** 0.538*** 0,560*** 0.550*** 0.534*** 0.554*** 0.633*** 0612*** 0.576"''' 0.569"'*-[312] [3.28] [335J [3.04] [295] [3.12] [337] [3.29] [3A3] [3.29]
Log Space 0095 0.084 0.077 0.098 0.053 0.094 0.067 0.061 0.059 0.065
(124] [1.12] [1.02] [1.27] [0.66] (1.22] [0.79] [0.81] [O.73J [0.79]
Share of male workers OA81 0.423 0.36 OA87 OA6 OA67 0.267 0309 03 0.306
[1.I3J [0.90] [0.88J [1.13] [1.I9J (1.06] [060] [072J [0.71] [0.73]
Shareof parttime workers 0.067 0.03 I 0025 0.065 0.064 0.059 0.021 0.036 0.006 0
[0.66] [0.27] [0.26] [0.62] [0.61] [0.61] [0.19] [025) [0.06] [0.00]
Shareof full time workers 0.083 0.137 0075 0.114 0089 0.074 0.066 0225 0.069 0.127
[0.18] [0.29] [017] [0.24] [O.2°J [0.17] [0.14J [0.49] [0.15] [0.26]
Average tenure (months) 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0004 0.004* 0004* 0003 0004 0.004
[1.62] [IA4] [I 56] [1.63J [160] [1.69] (1.69] [138] [160] [1.65]
Population densIty
-0011
*
-0008 -0009
-0011* -0010* -0.011* -0009* -0.007 -0008 -0.009
[1.90] [1.53J [1.60] [1.90J [1.68] [1.89J [l72J [1.47] [1.55] [1.59]
Net migration 3.317 3899 3992 3.173 3.821 3258 3086 4.304 3.672 3.415
(1.07] [1.23] [1.28] [1.00] [1.14] [1.01] [0.93] [1.29] [1.08] [0.99J
Net income -15A2 -4.156 -6.276 -15.177 -8361 -15.101 -8.908 3.016 -3.639 -2.835
[131] [0.30] [047] [1.25] [O.64J [1.28] [0.69] [0.19] [0.27] [0.20]
Shareof highly educated 3.649 4637 4.984 3.384 4534 3.219 4A03 7.745 4.058 3.577
[OA6] [065] [0.60J [OA3] [056J [OAO] [058] [0.99] [0.53J [OA8J
Home ownerhip 0611 0869 0.623 0.53 0.762 0553 0.504 0.847 0.561 OA08
[078] [0.98] [080] [0.63] [1.00] [066] [0.61] [0.87) [067] [OA6]
Retail establishments/habitants 48748 29.716 44.604 44.053 29745 49826 29.315 -27.064 31.289 22.025
[1.27] [0.86J [I 18] [1.05] [072] [1.27J [070J [OA3J [0.84] [0.51]
Averageturnover of retail establishments 0023 0.016 0.015 0.021 0022 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.017 0.014
[0.65] [OA6] [042] [0.60] [069] [0.63J [068] [OA6] [050] [OAI]
Information shanng 0.081 ** 0051[230] [0.91)
Participation on the job 0.05 0.005
[IAO] (010)
Developmenttalks -0.018 -0051 -0033
[0.28J [0.81) [0.56J
Performancefeedback 0.066 0013
[IAOJ [O.27J
Supervisor acknowledgement 0.008 -0034
[0.26) [O.89J
Shared goals 0,052** 0.053
[2.11] (lA6J
Scale 0.036* 0.037*
[1.93J [1.91)
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
R-squared 0.58 0.63 059 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.66 0611 0.614
Number of establishments 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Notes I) Coefficients are reported in the table andt-statlsticsin brackets
2) Sigmficanceof the varibles is indicated as foHows:'"significant at 10%;
**
sIgnificant at5%;
**'"
significantat 1%
3)The t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within each establishment
4) The specificatIOns mclude a constant, manager dummies, and year dummies
5) R-squaredis theunadjustedwithin R-squared
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0.053**' 0.060**'
[313] [3.17]
-0.012 -0.003
[1.07]
904 904
0.877 0.877
43 43
Information sharing
(I)
0.077**
[2.30J
-0004
[009]
Information sharing
'+12
Participation on the job
Participation on the job"12
Development talks
Development talks
'+12
Performance feedback
Performance feedback ,+12
Supervisor acknowledgement
Supervisor acknowledgement ,+12
Shared goals
Shared goals
'+12
Scale
Scale
'+12
0.161'**
[3.92]
-0002
[0.05]
(2)
TABLE5
Exogeneity Tests
(3) (4)
0.163***
[3.69]
0.032
[051]
904
0.877
44
-0.002
[0.04J
-0.016
[063J
904
0.875
43
(5) (6)
0.052
[0.53]
-0.061*
[1.81]
0.035
[0.88]
-0.012
[0.36]
904
0.875
43
Observations 904 904 904
R-squared 0.876 0.877 0.875
Number of establishments 44 44 44
Notes. 1) Coefficients are reported in the table and t-statistics in brackets.
2) Significance of the varibles is indicated as follows: . significant at 10%;" significant at 5%; ... significant at 1%.
3)The t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within each establishment.
4) The specifications include a constant, manager dummies,and month and year dummies.
5) R-squared is the unadjusted within R-squared
6) Other independent variables are the same as in Table 3.
(7) (8)
[0.24]
0.084
[0.91]
-0.077'*
[2.28]
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Endnotes
I A possible exception is Banker et al. (1996) that studies the link between incentive pay and
performance.
2 For the specific case of Finland other work on related issues suggests that there is potentially
much to be learned that is of broader interest. See for example the analysis of the effects of
high performance workplace practices on Finnish workers by Kalmi and Kauhanen (2005).
3 For useful reviews see Harley (2005), Appelbaum et al. (2000) and Heller et al. (1998).
4 While we concentrate on Appelbaum et ai, we note that others have adopted frameworks
that also argue for the existence of complementarities between particular HRM practices.
These frameworks also imply that different HRM environments will be expected to produce
different impacts on business performance. See, for examine, Levine (1995) and Ben-Ner and
Jones (1995).
5 Recent years have also witnessed a growing body of research by labor economists on the
retail sector that investigates other matters, for example the impact of major retailers such as
Wal Mart on job creation or job destruction (Basker, 2005; Neumark et aI., 2005) or links
between aggregate and micro productivity (Foster et aI., 2002.)
6 These difficulties have also been noted by researchers in manufacturing (e.g. Cappelli and
Neumark, 2001.) There is also an extensive literature that addresses similar matters for non-
mainstream forms of economic organization. The review by Bonin et al (1993) includes
discussion for the case of producer cooperatives.
7 For a discussion on the Finnish industrial relations system see Jones et al. (2006).
8 Our interviews revealed that employees may occasionally receive team-based discretionary
bonuses for exceptionally good performance. However these are relatively rare and
constituted only a very small fraction of total pay, and there was no formal performance-
related pay structure in the company during the study period.
9 Unsurprisingly, these issues have been the subject of research in the retail marketing
literature. For example, Bitner (1992) discusses the impact of the surroundings on customers
(and employees), while the influence of product assortment and display is considered by
Simonson (1999). Bell and Menquc (2002) and Keaveney (1995) examine the effect of
interaction with customers on business performance.
10For definitions of influential observations and outliers, see e.g., Chatterjee and Hadi (1986).
A closer inspection of the outliers revealed that two observations were probably contaminated
by coding errors and the rest were due to exceptional demand shocks during the summertime.
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Full details of the analysis used to exclude the outliers and the 11 observations is available
upon request.
11In addition we subtracted from net sales estimates for reduced prices, lost items, and value
added tax (VAT).
12These particular items are selected since they correspond most closely to the theoretical
concepts that we are interested in. Unfortunately the data we received do not contain good
proxies for employee skills. To some extent we can control for the importance of skills by
including the average tenure of employees in regressions. Note that in the Finnish context
most salespeople hold a secondary degree and that, consequently, it might be inappropriate to
regard "low-skill" as "unskilled".
13 For a balanced panel the total variance is the sum of the within and between variances. This
relation does not hold for unbalanced data. Thus calculating the share of within variance of
the total variance is feasible only in the case of balanced panel.
14 Becker and Huselid (1998, 63) argue that a coherent combination ofHRM practices may
depend on firm specific factors, which suggests the use of a single, additive index. MacDuffie
(1995) argues that additive indexes are attractive because unlike multiplicative ones, they do
not imply that if one component of the index is not present the bundle takes the value zero
also. For this reason he uses additive indexes, but in the analysis he uses interaction terms of
the additive indexes he constructs. Huselid (1995) uses factor analysis to identify bundles in
the data, and then uses this information to construct additive scales. The additive indexes are
especially attractive when the original data are based on scale variables, as opposed to binary
variables.
15 The stores are located in 39 different municipalities.
16Most other studies of the HR-performance link in services do not have information on these
matters.
17 In related literature (e.g. Bonin et aI., 1993;Jones, 1987;Kruse, 1993)a recurring theme has
been to empirically investigate the appropriate form of technology. Since an F-test cannot
reject at the five percent level the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for the quadratic terms
in the translog model, the Cobb-Douglas form is preferred over the translog. Furthermore, the
Cobb-Douglas form is also preferred when applying Bayesian information criteria.
18See e.g. Cameron & Trivedi (2005, 706-708), Wooldridge (2002, 274-278), Bertrand et al.
(2004), and Kezdi (2004).
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19 There have been two reasons for this. Firstly, these estimators have not been incorporated
into standard econometrics packages. Secondly, their small sample properties have not been
known very well. This second point is important for us, since the cross section dimension of
our data is not very large.
20 However, we did experiment with alternative ways of capturing the data from the survey
responses, including using measures that captured dispersion in the data. Our regression
findings are essentially insensitive to the use of these alternative procedures.
21The results of principal component analysis are available upon request.
22 As such our approach to the creation of an index is similar to the procedure used by others
such as Mac Duffie (1995) and also Huselid (1995) and Huselid and Becker (1996), although
the latter two studies used factor analysis.
23Precise test scores are as follows: F(6, 46)=3.03, Prob >F=0.014.
24We also experimented with 36 time dummies. The key results do not change. These results
are available upon request.
25The F-test is as follows: F(6, 46)=5.55; Prob >F =0.0002
26 The results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the lead. It is not clear how to choose the
lead values in the monthly case, when the variation in the variables takes place at the annual
level. Small lead values (e.g. one month lead) give different results. However, when the data
are aggregated to an annual level, the choice of the lead is simpler. In the annual case, the
results of these tests are similar to the 12 month lead case in the monthly data.
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